Begin-Carter Peace Talks – 1977
Background
During the Six-Day War in June 1967, Israel captured Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Hostilities between the two nations persisted for the following three years, eventually escalating into the War of Attrition (1969–1970), an unsuccessful Egyptian effort to reclaim the Sinai through sustained military pressure. In October 1973, Sadat launched the Yom Kippur War, aiming to regain lost territories by compelling Israel to negotiate under more favorable terms for Arab nations.[1]
Following the war, the United States intensified pressure on Israel to negotiate a peace agreement with Egypt, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger leading these diplomatic efforts. This led to the Israel-Egypt Disengagement Agreement in January 1974 followed by the Sinai Interim Agreement in September 1975, in which Israel withdrew from strategic passes and oil fields in the Sinai.[2] The Rebbe strongly criticized these concessions, arguing that surrendering strategic assets and natural resources under external pressure undermined national security and failed to produce a lasting peace.[3]
Following the 1975 agreement, formal negotiations stalled as the fundamental disagreement over the extent of territorial withdrawal remained unresolved.[4]
Begin-Carter Preliminary Peace Talks (1977)
President Carter’s Peace Initiative

Upon assuming office in January 1977, U.S. President Jimmy Carter made achieving a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement a central foreign policy goal.[5] Consistent with post-1967 U.S. policy, he urged Israel to withdraw from territories captured in 1967, but placed particular emphasis on securing Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza.[6]
The Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, was willing to negotiate a peace agreement that would entail significant territorial concessions but opposed a full return to the pre-1967 lines due to the need for defensible borders.[7]
In May 1977, Menachem Begin was elected Prime Minister of Israel. While he continued several policies of his predecessor, including expressing openness to peace talks with Egypt and potential territorial withdrawals in the Sinai Peninsula, he took a firmer stance in supporting the expansion of Jewish settlements in Judea and Samaria, a policy the United States considered illegal. He opposed any territorial withdrawals from those regions, as well as from the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights. He regarded these territories as part of the biblical Land of Israel, to which the Jewish people hold an inherent right, and as vital to Israel’s security, asserting that relinquishing them would place “every city and home in Israel within range of Arab guns.”[8]
The Rebbe’s Perspective on the Peace Negotiations
Throughout this period, the Rebbe consistently encouraged the Israeli government to resist international pressure and avoid making concessions that could undermine national security. He argued, on the basis of historical precedent, that yielding on matters affecting Israel’s security would not lead to peace but instead invite additional pressure.
At the time, Israeli leaders increasingly operated on the premise that demonstrating diplomatic flexibility – particularly toward the United States – was necessary to maintain political support and preserve Israel’s international standing.[9] The Rebbe maintained that such an approach misunderstood the dynamics of international diplomacy and ultimately reinforced, rather than alleviated, demands placed on Israel.
As an illustration, he cited Israel’s acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 – calling for Israeli withdrawal from territories captured in 1967 in exchange for peace – adopted under international pressure,[10] which he viewed as a pivotal turning point in the emergence of sustained international pressure on Israel:
- All of the pressure [today] can be traced back to that well-known resolution, 242.
- How did that resolution come about? It was adopted because there were Jews who feared international condemnation; under pressure they gave in, and a text was drafted that became the foundation for all subsequent pressure on Israel. . . . From then on, whenever negotiations begin, the first thing invoked is Resolution 242, adopted by a majority [in the Security Council]. . . .
- This demonstrates that by yielding ground on something the Torah does not permit to concede, Israel gained neither practical peace nor peace of mind from the international community. On the contrary, it invited further pressure – pressure that has continued for many years since.[11]
The Rebbe believed that Israel’s strategic posture was inseparable from the clarity and confidence with which its leadership understood and articulated its claim to the land. He maintained that when Israeli leaders and the broader public possessed a firm conviction in the moral legitimacy of that claim, they would be better positioned to pursue policies aligned with Israel’s long-term security and strategic interests. He therefore emphasized that the Jewish people’s right to the Land of Israel was a divinely granted inheritance held by every Jew:
- G-d granted the Land of Israel to each Jew, wherever he may be, as an eternal covenant, an ancestral inheritance, and an everlasting possession, something that no one has the power to alter, even if he wishes to do so.[12]
On this basis, the Rebbe urged the Israeli government to frame its position accordingly when engaging with the international community. Beyond regarding this as the true basis of Jewish sovereignty in the land, he maintained that this argument alone could serve as an effective and internationally sustainable justification, whereas alternative rationales grounded in historical precedent, diplomatic agreements, or modern political circumstances would be insufficient to secure lasting recognition:
- When the Jews take a clear and unwavering stand – making it known that [their claim to the Land of Israel] is not a matter of their own choice or initiative, nor dependent on an the signing of the [Balfour] Declaration in London some fifty years ago . . . but rather a tradition received from Moses our teacher, who conveyed in the Torah – the “Torah of truth” – that from the time of Joshua’s conquest the land of the seven nations belongs to the Jewish people . . . then there will be genuine peace in the land.
- Whenever we offer other explanations, the world senses that we are not authentically representing what we believe – and naturally, they respond in kind. They too will stop speaking truthfully, saying one thing while doing another, and the result will be the exact opposite of peace. . . . Only by holding firmly to this truth can genuine peace be achieved.
- The clearest proof is history itself: For years, the path taken was one of compromise – negotiating back and forth, offering one part after another – and yet, to this very day, peace has yet to be reached.[13]
The Rebbe emphasized that a biblically grounded articulation of Israel’s claim to the land was particularly applicable in discussions with President Carter, who publicly professed his religious faith.[14][15]
Begin’s Trip to Washington

Shortly after Prime Minister Begin assumed office, President Carter invited him to Washington, D.C. for a meeting on July 19, 1977, aimed at advancing the Middle East peace process. In the weeks preceding the meeting, however, tensions emerged amid growing concern in Washington over what it viewed as an increasingly rigid Israeli stance on negotiations, with Carter publicly rejecting Begin’s position on territorial withdrawal, emphasizing that no territory should be excluded in principle from negotiations.[16]
While en route to Washington, D.C., Prime Minister Begin made a stop in New York to meet with several Jewish leaders, most notably the Rebbe, at Lubavitch World Headquarters on July 17, 1977.
After arriving, Begin and the Rebbe held a brief press conference. Begin stated that he sought the Rebbe’s blessings ahead of his “important talks on the future of the Middle East,” and the Rebbe expressed his prayers for the Prime Minister’s success and “real peace” in the region.
The Rebbe and Begin then met privately for over an hour. At the conclusion of the audience it was agreed that Yehuda Avner, Begin’s adviser and speechwriter, would return to New York after the White House talks to report to the Rebbe on their outcome.
Following the meeting, when asked by the press to share the contents of his conversation with the Rebbe, Begin declined, saying that his conversations with the Rebbe were “completely confidential” and part of a long-standing tradition between them. He later recounted that the Rebbe had spoken of the importance of maintaining control over the entire Land of Israel as essential to the nation’s security.[17]
On July 19–20, 1977, Begin met with President Carter in Washington. During the talks, Begin stood firm on Israel’s key positions, rejecting negotiations with the PLO and opposing a return to the pre-1967 borders, while expressing readiness to pursue peace with Egypt. Both leaders described the meetings as constructive and as a step forward in the peace process.[18]
Notably, throughout his visit to Washington, Begin openly expressed his Jewish faith and identity, frequently invoking his belief in G-d and the Bible. He emphasized his conviction that the government of Israel had no right to prevent Jews from settling in any part of the Land of Israel, because the land had been granted by G-d to the Jewish people. At the official White House dinner on July 19, Begin announced that the meal before him was kosher, donned a kippah, and recited the blessing over the food. He remarked that he had not come to the White House alone, but accompanied by the prayers of sages and Jews around the world.
Begin’s convictions and personal demeanor made a favorable impression, reflected in President Carter’s remarks to those assembled at the dinner, “We have had a chance to get to know each other personally, and it has been obvious to me that our guest is a strong leader. He is a man of deep convictions and unshakable principle. He is a man of truth and quiet dignity. He is a man who is polite and very modest,” and expressed optimism about achieving a lasting peace in the Middle East.[19]
In a letter dated August 1, 1977, the Rebbe praised Begin’s conduct during the Washington visit:
- It is the general consensus that this worthy deportment of the Jewish representative during his first encounter with the President of the USA had an immensely favorable impact and has established a personal rapport between the two leaders which will hopefully have far-reaching beneficial results also in terms of American support. . . .
- Here, for the first time, came a Jewish Prime Minister who declared in a loud and clear voice that he comes strengthened by the prayers of his fellow Jews at home and abroad and trusts in G‑d and the eternity of his people that his mission will be successful. And, as you surely know, when he sat down to break bread with President Carter, he made sure that it would be a Kosher meal, and he put on a Yarmulka [skullcap] and made a Berocho [blessing] and explained to the President the meaning of it. All of which has earned him the respect and admiration of the President and of all others who came in contact with him. Even from a pragmatic statesmanlike viewpoint this approach is bound to be a sure winner, though, regretfully, it had not been recognized by his predecessors.[20]
After the White House meetings, Yehuda Avner met with the Rebbe in New York to report on the talks. Avner later recalled:
- I gave the Rebbe a report of the meeting. I’m not permitted to go into details, because there are still segments of that meeting that are classified. I must have spoken for half an hour, and then the Rebbe began to comment.[21]
- He asked me to take down verbatim, a message to communicate to Menachem Begin. . . . “Please tell Prime Minister Begin: ‘Your words to President Carter, the firm stand that you took on the Land of Israel – by adopting that posture, you have given strength to the whole of the Jewish people. Your task is to continue to safeguard the integrity of the Land of Israel. Be forthright! Be bold! Be without pretence! Be without apology! Be strong and of good courage! I know it is a difficult thing to do, but I have to tell you that you must do your best, because this is your mission as prime minister of Israel. More than that, I cannot ask.”[22]
- My presentation and his interrogation took close to four hours.[23]
- I flew back to Jerusalem with hard information and with concrete proposals that had a direct bearing on the aftermath of the Prime Minister’s talk with the President of the United States.[24]
Aftermath
By late 1977, Israel remained under sustained diplomatic pressure to pursue territorial withdrawal as part of a broader peace framework, while core disagreements over security, borders, and recognition persisted. As a result, despite ongoing international mediation efforts, the peace process had not produced concrete outcomes.[25]
References
- ↑ “War of Attrition.” Britannica; “The Hidden Calculation behind the Yom Kippur War.” Hudson Institute.
- ↑ “Shuttle Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1975.” Office of the Historian; “Israel-Egypt Disengagement Agreement, 18 January, 1974.” United Nation Security Council; “Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt, 4 September, 1975.” Economic Cooperation Foundation.
- ↑ Address, 19 Kislev, 5736. Toras Menachem vol. 82 p. ??; Sichos Kodesh vol. 1 pp. 248-250; Audio.
- ↑ “Sinai Peninsula: The Years of Conflict.” New York Times, April 26, 1982; “Rabin Rules Out Any Negotiation with P.L.O. Heads.” New York Times, January 29, 1976.
- ↑ Lynelle M. A. Philbrick, “A Passion for Peace: An Examination of Prudential Leadership Applied to Jimmy Carter's Middle East Peace Accomplishments,” All Theses & Dissertations, (2010), 15; Galen Jackson, “Book Review Roundtable: Arab-Israeli Diplomacy Under Carter,” Texas National Security Review, (December 19, 2019); “Politics: Carter, the World and the Jews.” TIME, June 27, 1977.
- ↑ Town Hall, Clinton, Massachusetts, March 16, 1977; “The Unraveling of Jimmy Carter’s Middle East,” Alex Hobson, New Lines Magazine, April 28, 2023; “Newly Released Minutes Show US Pressure on Israel to Leave West Bank in ’78.” Times of Israel, July 29, 2018; Memorandum of Conversation Between U.S. President Carter and Israeli Prime Minister Begin and Their Delegations, March 1978; “Begin Rejects Carter's Stand on Settlements.” The Washington Post, February 10, 1978; “Kissinger Memorandum: ‘To Isolate the Palestinians’,” Middle East Report, no. 96 (May/June 1981); “Politics: Carter, the World and the Jews.” TIME, June 27, 1977; Lyndon B. Johnson: Statement on Principles for Peace in the Middle East, 19 June 1967.
- ↑ “Rabin: Israel Ready for Concessions; Urges USSR to End Policy of Diplomatically Ignoring Israel.” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, January 29, 1975; “Rabin Says Carter Asked Too Much on Frontier Issue.” New York Times, March 14, 1977.
- ↑ Gerald M. Steinberg and Ziv Rubinovitz, Menachem Begin and the Israel-Egypt Peace Process: Between Ideology and Political Realism (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2019), Chapter 2; “Menahem Begin TV Interview.” Menachem Begin Heritage Center, May 22, 1977; “Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s Palestinian Autonomy Plan, 1977.” Center for Israel Education; Menachem Begin, CIA, July 7, 1977; Memorandum of Conversation Between President Carter and Prime Minister Rabin, March 1977, Center for Israel Education; “Israel: Stormy Start for a Stylish Hard-Liner.” TIME, July 4, 1977; “Begin and Carter Meet in July 1977.” Center for Israel Education.
- ↑ See “President’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan,” October 4, 1977; “Carter and Dayan Have Brutal Exchange,” October 4, 1977; Memorandum of Conversation, July 19, 1977; “Memorandum from the Brzezinski to President Carter,” August 31, 1978.
- ↑ United Nations Security Council Resolution 242; Fred Strickert, “United Nations Security Council Adopts Resolution 242,” EBSCO Knowledge Advantage, (2023).
- ↑ Address, 12 Tammuz, 5737. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 216; Audio.
- ↑ Address, 3 Sivan, 5737. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3, pp. 38-39; Audio.
- ↑ Address, 3 Sivan, 5737. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 41; Audio.
- ↑ Address, 12 Tammuz, 5737. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 215; Audio.
- ↑ “How Jimmy Carter Integrated His Evangelical Christian Faith into His Political Work, Despite Mockery and Misunderstanding.” The Conversation, February 27, 2023; William B. Quandt, “Forty Years in Search of Arab-Israeli Peace,” Macalester International, (2009), 27.
- ↑ “U.S. Statement on the Middle East.” New York Times, June 28, 1977; “Middle East: A Warning Shot Across Begin’s Bow.” TIME, July 11, 1977; “U.S. Calls on Israel to Quit Some Lands in All the Sectors.” New York Times, June 28, 1977; “U.S. Presses Concessions by Israelis.” Washington Post, June 27, 1977.
- ↑ “The Israeli Prime Minister's Jewish Pride.” Chabad.org; “Begin Plans to Reveal Peace Ideas Soon.” New York Times, July 18, 1977; Visit by Israel’s Prime Minister, JEM; Lubavitcher Rebbe Press Statement with Menachem Begin, JEM; Lecture by Ambassador Yehuda Avner, Chabad of Oxford University; “The Jewish Soul Lobby.” Shlomo Nakdimon, Chabad.org.
- ↑ Memorandum of Conversation: President Carter’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin of Israel, July 19, 1977. Office of the Historian; Memorandum of Conversation: President Carter’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin of Israel, July 20, 1977. Office of the Historian; Memorandum to President Carter, July 19, 1977. Office of the Historian; “Excerpts From Carter's Remarks.” New York Times, July 21, 1977; “Israelis Heartened by Outcome of Visit.” New York Times, July 22, 1977; “Officials Jubilant Over the Success of Begin's U.S. Trip.” The Detroit Jewish News, July 29, 1977.
- ↑ “The Israeli Prime Minister's Jewish Pride.” Chabad.org; Toasts between Prime Minister Begin and President Carter, 19 July 1977. Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Memorandum of Conversation: President Carter’s Meeting with Prime Minister Begin of Israel, July 19, 1977. Office of the Historian.
- ↑ When an Israeli Prime Minister Shows Jewish Pride in Washington. Chabad.org.
- ↑ The String and the Flame. Yehudah Avner, JEM.
- ↑ Menachem Begin, Faithful and Fortified: Israel’s Prime Ministers. Yehudah Avner, JEM.
- ↑ Lecture by Ambassador Yehuda Avner, Chabad of Oxford University.
- ↑ Menachem Begin, Faithful and Fortified: Israel’s Prime Ministers. Yehudah Avner, JEM.
- ↑ Diego Filiu, “Explaining the Camp David Summit: An Individual-Based Approach to Foreign Policy Decision-Making,” The Yale Review of International Studies, December 1, 2016; Camp David Accords and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, Office of the Historian; Ken Stein, 1977: Carter, Brzezinksi Avidly Sought Limits on Israeli Influence in Washington, Center for Israel Education.