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The 329 Paradigm

From Enduring Peace Knowledge Base

Overview

The 329 Paradigm is a security framework derived from section 329 of the Code of Jewish Law, identified by the Rebbe as foundational Torah guidance for maintaining security.

The Israeli Navy defends Israel's longest border - its Mediterranean shore.

Grounded in Torah's principle that preserving life supersedes all other values, this framework teaches that strategic decisions should prioritize tangible security over diplomatic or political considerations, and that long-term diplomatic success follows from, rather than precedes, concrete security.

The 329 Paradigm provides tools for risk assessment and strategic prioritization by asking a fundamental question about any proposed action: Does this strengthen actual physical security or compromise it? Applied across military operations, diplomatic negotiations, and policy formulation, the framework offers clarity for navigating Israel's complex security and geopolitical dilemmas.

Provenance

Primary Source

The Code of Jewish Law, Laws of Shabbat, section 329 discusses the suspension of usual Shabbat restrictions when life is endangered, consistent with the principle that preserving human life supersedes all commandments, including Shabbat. Crucially, Jewish law does not require certainty that lives are at risk – even the possibility of danger is sufficient to mandate immediate protective action.[1]

Addressing potential threats to Jewish communities on Shabbat, the law states:

When non-Jews besiege a Jewish city: If they come for money, do not desecrate Shabbat; if they come to kill, or with no stated reason, go out with weapons and desecrate Shabbat [in defense].

However, the law establishes a critical principle under which military response is required, even when there is no apparent threat to life:

If the city is near the border, even if the attackers come only to plunder hay or straw, Shabbat must be desecrated [and you must respond militarily].

Rema adds:

Even if they haven’t yet come, but merely intend to come.[2]

The Halachic authorities explain the rationale:

Lest they capture the town, and from there, the land will be easier for them to conquer.[3]

Allowing a territorial breach at the border, regardless of the limited scope of the incursion, grants the attacker a foothold in the land and creates a vulnerability.

Torah views this seemingly innocuous intrusion as a life-threatening situation, since the resulting vulnerability may lead to loss of life. On this basis, Jewish law mandates the suspension of Shabbat and the use of force to repel such an incursion, treating even the slightest breach of defenses – even one as small as theft of “hay and straw” – as an immediate danger.[4]

Since the observance of Shabbat is suspended only for matters of mortal danger, this ruling establishes a foundational principle: Any breach of defenses that could lead to the land being “open before them” must be treated as life-threatening, even when it is known with certainty that there is no current threat of attack.

Origins and Development

The earliest source for this law is recorded in the Book of Samuel.[5] On the run as a fugitive from King Saul, King David received word of a raiding party of Philistines pilfering grain from the city of Ke’ilah. Despite the lack of immediate danger to life, David led his men to battle. The Talmud explains that Ke’ilah was a border town.[6]

In the Talmudic period, this ruling was applied to the city of Neharde’a (present-day Iraq), a border city with a substantial Jewish population that was exposed to potential attack (see “Geography: Where 329 Applies,” below).[6][7]

The law was subsequently codified in all major works of Jewish law.[8]

Contemporary Application

The 329 Framework

Beginning in 1977, this ruling served as a touchstone for the Rebbe’s guidance on Israel’s security.[9] On dozens of occasions, the Rebbe pointed to it as a practical tool for Israel to determine the proper course of action across a broad spectrum of security and diplomatic issues.

IDF soldiers guard the border fence between Israel and Egypt.

The Rebbe argued that section 329 establishes a primary criterion for evaluating security policy: whether a proposal reinforces defensive ability or introduces strategic vulnerabilities. Any action that diminishes Israel’s ability to defend territory or prevent adversaries from gaining operational advantages triggers the obligation to preserve life.

Assessments of such proposals must therefore hinge exclusively on concrete security conditions and operational realities – not political, economic, or diplomatic considerations.

It follows that concrete security is non-negotiable. No external pressure – economic, diplomatic, or otherwise – can justify measures that reduce security, even against threats not yet active.

In a 1980 private audience, the Rebbe demonstrated how this approach emerges from the wording of the Talmudic case cited in section 329:

Jewish law rules that this must be treated as a matter of life and death. . . . The Talmud refers to a group planning to come for hay and straw. They want a bit of hay or straw, and they will immediately withdraw. You’d think, “Just give them the hay! You can always fight later on.”
But the Torah of Truth, the Torah of Life, rules decisively: Even if they are only planning to come, and they only want hay and straw, and afterwards they will return home – but for several moments they will be on territory from which “the land will be easy to conquer” . . . you must take up arms, take up positions, and prevent entry.[10]

Even when Israel faces dependence on foreign resources, the Rebbe maintained that external needs or pressures must not influence decisions affecting national defense:

Although Israel finds itself in a situation where it needs resources – whether money, weapons, or advice – from foreign sources . . . when it comes to its national defense, no external pressure may influence its decisions. Israel must stand firm, confident that by doing so, it will not only avoid negative outcomes but, in fact, strengthen its position and earn respect for the Jewish people on the international stage.[11]

The Rebbe clarified that maintaining firm positions on essential security matters does not entail disregarding relationships with the United States or other allies but instead ensures stable and durable partnerships aligned with Israel’s security requirements and the broader strategic interests of its allies. A secure Israel, the Rebbe maintained, is itself a core American interest that outlasts any particular diplomatic request or short-term policy preference.[12]

In a 1989 conversation with Elyakim Rubinstein, Cabinet Secretary and adviser to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, the Rebbe said:

The only approach that has proven effective [for Israel in dealing] with the United States is to stand firm and explain that such resolve is not rooted in stubbornness, but is a matter of survival. Ultimately, it is in the interest of the United States that Israel be strong in the Middle East as Israel is the only true partner of the United States there.[13]

The Rebbe pointed out that Israel’s security situation is substantially more severe than the scenario described in 329 – in which hostile parties claim to seek only “hay and straw” before withdrawing – noting that Israel’s adversaries openly declared their intention to seize territory and dismantle the state.[14]

Qualification for Security Risk Assessment

Main article: Qualification for Security Risk Assessment

The Rebbe taught that under Jewish law, determinations of what constitutes a threat must be made by qualified experts within Israel’s military and security establishment with access to the most up-to-date intelligence, rather than by political leaders, ensuring that decisions with life-threatening implications are based on professional security assessments rather than on political judgment or other secondary considerations:

In the case of a gravely ill patient – when the issue concerns only one limb of a single person – Jewish law states explicitly[1] that the only opinion to take into account is that of a qualified physician . . . who is actively practicing medicine and is familiar with the most up-to-date knowledge in the field.
The same principle applies to matters of [national] security: The only view that carries authority in military affairs is that of someone with genuine, up-to-date expertise who is actively engaged in the field and familiar with the latest strategic methods and developments. Those who are not military experts, even if they are good friends or close allies, cannot have their opinions factored in, and certainly not when they have vested [personal or political] interests.[15]

The Rebbe cautioned, however, that not every argument presented by a military figure could be presumed by default to constitute a security assessment:

When a military officer presents arguments of a political nature, one must determine whether those arguments serve to avert a life-threatening situation or whether they rest primarily on political calculations. If they are based on the latter, then such reasoning runs contrary to the requirements of Jewish law.[16]

Geography: Where 329 Applies

The Rebbe contended that Israel’s overall security landscape required treating the entire country as a “border town,” given its small geographic size, dense concentration of population and infrastructure, lack of strategic depth, and the presence of hostile neighbors on multiple fronts. Under these conditions, any territorial vulnerability or loss of defensive control in one area has immediate implications for the security of the country as a whole, rendering the defensive status of each region inseparable from the protection of the entire land.[17]

THE SASSANID EMPIRE c. 620

Importantly, however, the obligation to defend a border city is not specific to Israel. The Rebbe often pointed to the application of this rule by the Talmudic sage Rav Nachman to his native city of Nehardea, demonstrating that this principle applies to vulnerable border regions even outside the Land of Israel. Nehardea was a major Jewish center in Babylonia, situated near zones of imperial contest between Rome and Persia, and its Jewish community was destroyed during Rav Nachman’s lifetime by hostile neighboring forces.[18]

In a 1980 letter to Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, Chief Rabbi of the United Kingdom, the Rebbe explained:

I have repeatedly emphasized that this Halachic ruling has nothing to do with the sanctity of Israel, or with “days of Mashiach,” the future redemption, and similar considerations, but solely with the rule of preserving human life. This is further emphasized by the fact that this ruling has its source in the Talmud (Eruvin 45a), where the Talmud cites as an illustration of a “border-town” under the terms of this ruling – the city of Neharde’a in Babylon (present-day Iraq) – clearly not in Israel. I have emphasized time and time again that it is a question of, and should be judged purely on the basis of, risk to life, not geography.[7]

On another occasion, the Rebbe elaborated:

If concessions are made to terrorists, this creates the vulnerability that allows an area to be conquered, and there is no distinction in this regard between the Land of Israel and Borough Park, Kew Gardens, Williamsburg, Crown Heights, or Bnei Brak; in every location, the same rule applies.[19]

The Rebbe invoked this principle in 1969 regarding Jewish communities considering leaving Brooklyn neighborhoods due to rising crime. Referencing section 329, the Rebbe maintained that abandoning these areas would create vulnerabilities for remaining residents and would potentially encourage similar pressures in other Jewish neighborhoods.[20]

Territorial Integrity

Section 329 rests on the basic military principle that territory itself is the primary strategic asset in defending human life. The Rebbe therefore opposed territorial concessions that involved relinquishing control over strategically significant areas.

As the Rebbe wrote to Rabbi Jakobovitz:

I am completely and unequivocally opposed to the surrender of any of the liberated areas currently under negotiation, such as Judea and Samaria, the Golan, etc., for the simple reason, and only reason, that surrendering any part of them would contravene a clear ruling in Code of Jewish Law.[7]

In the classical halachic formulation, even attackers who claim to seek only limited access – such as “stealing hay and straw” – are treated as posing a mortal danger, because allowing entry into a border town grants them a foothold from which the town, and subsequently the surrounding land, becomes vulnerable to conquest.[21]

Jewish law therefore places central emphasis on maintaining control over strategic territory as the most reliable means of protecting both local inhabitants and the broader population. By contrast, relinquishing such positions is effectively “opening up the land” to the enemy, creating vulnerabilities that carry serious risks for public safety.

This approach parallels a foundational principle of warfare: strategic depth – the control of buffer territory – is essential to defense.[22] Notably, Israel’s early defense doctrines were built on this premise.[23]

Land For Peace

By this reasoning, the Rebbe argued that peace initiatives involving security compromises are fundamentally flawed, as they exchange tangible defensive capabilities for assurances that cannot guarantee long-term safety, thereby weakening national security:

Security experts have stated clearly that unless firm opposition is maintained against the surrender of territory, in any of the areas under discussion, . . . such actions place the lives of many Jewish men and women in mortal danger. This assessment has been reiterated repeatedly.[24]
Israeli settlements under construction near Bethlehem.

Following the Six-Day War, Israel’s borders gained a significant measure of inherent defensibility by aligning with natural barriers rather than exposed terrain – most notably the Golan Heights in the north-east, the Jordan River and Dead Sea to the east, and the Suez Canal to the south. In the years that followed, Israel faced sustained international pressure to pursue comprehensive peace agreements involving territorial concessions with its neighbors.

The Rebbe firmly maintained that the only way to achieve peace was by Israel holding onto these territories. He rejected the territorial demands placed on Israel, pointing to the uniform assessment of military and security professionals that withdrawal would undermine Israel’s ability to defend itself:[25]

It is a simple fact of reality. Ask any military expert whether a country can survive after giving up [such] territory, and their answer will be clear: in practical terms, it is impossible. Effective defense requires borders that run along natural barriers – such as a sea, a canal, or a high mountain – not a dividing line that cuts through the middle of a street. Under such conditions, Israel simply cannot defend itself in any practical sense.[26]

When confronted with claims that some figures within the security establishment supported territorial withdrawal, the Rebbe distinguished between military judgment and political calculation:

[In] regard to the liberated areas, all military experts, Jewish and non-Jewish, agree that in the present situation giving up any part of them would create serious security dangers. No one says that giving up any part of them would enhance the defensibility of the borders. But some military experts are prepared to take a chance in order not to antagonize Washington and/or to improve the “international image,” etc.[27]

Autonomy

Main article: Autonomy

The Rebbe applied the same principle to the granting of political or administrative autonomy to Israel’s Arab population. He posited that even were Israel to retain formal sovereignty, control over borders, and the ability to intervene militarily when necessary, any form of autonomy would degrade Israel’s capacity to maintain operational control within the area. This concern was reinforced by recent terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and the elevation of individuals involved in terrorist activity to positions of authority.[28] In security terms, autonomy creates vulnerabilities comparable to those produced by territorial concessions, thus increasing the risk to the surrounding population.[29]

Settlements

Main article: Settlements

As a means of maintaining territorial integrity, the Rebbe emphasized the strategic necessity of establishing permanent settlements along all of Israel’s borders. Border settlements constitute a central security measure, since temporary military presence alone cannot reliably secure extended and uninhabited frontiers. Populated areas ensure constant presence and observation,[30] require continuous security, and allow residents themselves to serve as both a deterrent and an immediate line of defense.[31] Accordingly, the Rebbe viewed the settlements as an integral component of Israel’s defensive system.[32]

Strategic Assets

In addition to physical territory, the Rebbe noted that relinquishing strategic assets can carry the same life-threatening implications as territorial withdrawal. Accordingly, he extended these halachic security principles to the retention of defensive assets essential to safeguarding human life. He pointed in particular to energy resources, such as oil fields in the Sinai, which had provided the country with a substantial degree of energy independence and were projected to enable oil exports.[33] Their loss, he maintained, increased Israel’s strategic vulnerability by rendering it dependent on external sources for a critical security resource:

Returning strategic territory or relinquishing control of oil reserves entails an immediate threat to human life. Such actions undermine the security of the Jewish population in the Land of Israel not in some distant future, but immediately.
As has been discussed many times, oil is indispensable for operating tanks, aircraft, and other critical equipment. Surrendering oil fields and thereby forcing reliance on foreign suppliers creates an immediate dependence – not months later, but from the very next day. It is self-evident that maintaining oil reserves sufficient for an extended period is not feasible; a reliable supply can be ensured only by retaining direct control over the oil fields and the ability to extract oil at the source.[34]

Beyond the security implications, surrendering these assets imposed severe economic costs – transforming Israel from a potential energy exporter into a nation burdened by costly oil imports.[35]

Vulnerability in the Diplomatic Sphere

The 329 paradigm instructs diplomatic positions and public statements, recognizing that such signals can carry security implications, either by projecting strength or by encouraging further adversarial violence.

In discussing the scope of section 329, the Rebbe emphasized that the halachic concern extends beyond overt military actions or physical breaches. The classical example of a dispute over “hay and straw” illustrates that the danger lies not in the material object itself, but in the potential consequences of any approach that effectively “opens the land before the enemy.”

Accordingly, an opening need not be physical in order to constitute a mortal danger. Diplomatic conduct and public political language can function as strategic signals with immediate security implications. Statements intended to convey goodwill or flexibility may instead be interpreted as weakness, thereby encouraging hostile behavior in the present. Such signals create immediate danger and must be avoided.[36]

First Intifada

In April 1990, during the First Intifada and amid intensifying public debate in Israel over the possibility of territorial concessions,[37] Shlomo Gazit, former head of Israeli Military Intelligence and a prominent security strategist,[38] visited the Rebbe. Gazit sought to assure the Rebbe that the ongoing discussions about potential territorial concessions were held with Israel’s security interests in mind. The Rebbe responded that the danger precedes the actual withdrawal and is measured instead by immediate changes in behavior on the ground. Even discussion of territorial withdrawal, he argued, encourages violence by signaling to hostile actors that pressure is producing results, a dynamic already visible in the ongoing Intifada:[39]

When one speaks [with the Arabs] in a friendly manner about the return of territories, without immediately rejecting it out of hand, this is taken as clear evidence that it is negotiable. . . . You are speaking [of there being no imminent danger] with regard to the withdrawal itself. But my concern is with the immediate effect [these discussions have] on the behavior of the Arabs toward Jews today, in the Old City of Jerusalem and in Judea and Samaria.[40]

Application in Specific Events

Sinai Campaign

In 1956, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, following its earlier move in 1955 to block Israeli shipping through the Straits of Tiran. In response, Israel, in coordination with the United Kingdom and France, launched a military operation, successfully seizing control of the Sinai Peninsula. However, under significant pressure from the United States, Israel withdrew from the Sinai. This withdrawal bolstered Egypt’s standing as a leader in the Arab world, enabling it to regroup and eventually plan future attacks against Israel from this strategically vital region.[41]

The Rebbe sharply criticized the withdrawal, arguing that relinquishing control of the Sinai transformed it from a vital strategic asset into a renewed source of danger, ultimately undermining Israel’s security and paving the way for further conflict.[42]

Post Six Day War

In the period following the Six Day War, Israel’s military victory left both Arab states and the international community awestruck by its power; nevertheless, Israel moved quickly to undercut that deterrent by signaling a willingness to relinquish the newly conquered territories.[43]

The Rebbe later argued that this overture was perceived as weakness in the Arab world, emboldening Israel’s adversaries to pursue further concessions through diplomatic pressure and renewed conflict.[44]

1975 Sinai Interim Agreement

The agreement established a buffer zone on the Sinai side of the Suez Canal, monitored by Egypt and the United Nations and led to Israel’s withdrawal from strategic locations in the Sinai Peninsula, including key oil fields and mountain passes. This arrangement laid the groundwork for the later Camp David Accords.[45]

The Rebbe sharply opposed the agreement, arguing that withdrawing from defensible positions, surrendering vital oil fields, and relying on unenforceable assurances fundamentally endangered Israel’s security and invited renewed conflict.[46]

Litani Campaign

In 1978, following a terrorist attack, Israel launched an incursion into Lebanon, gaining control over significant portions of southern Lebanon. However, shortly thereafter, Israel withdrew, leaving a power vacuum while major terrorist strongholds remained untouched. This development ultimately set the stage for the First Lebanon War.[47]

The Rebbe criticized the withdrawal as a grave security failure, arguing that leaving key terrorist strongholds intact ensured the reversal of military gains and the renewal of hostilities.[48]

Camp David Accords

In the late 1970s, Israel entered into a peace agreement with Egypt which entailed the full withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, including strategically significant assets such as oil fields and military positions, in exchange for formal Egyptian commitments to peace and security arrangements.[49]

The Rebbe criticized the agreement as a grave security error, arguing that surrendering vital strategic assets and territorial depth in exchange for diplomatic commitments fundamentally endangered Israel’s ability to defend itself.

Autonomy Negotiations

In the late 1980s, talk of “Autonomy” became popularized, with the hope that civil autonomy for the Arabs living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza would lead to peaceful relations.[50] The Rebbe argued that the government’s engagement in such discussions was a violation of section 329, and would only lead to further bloodshed.[51]

Other Mentions

List additional letters, Sichos, etc., from the Rebbe on this subject, with links.

  • All of Eretz Yisrael is on the border: Sicha, 10 Teves, 5738 - Audio
  • The first time the Rebbe speaks about 329: Sicha, 10 Teves, 5738 - Audio

Further Reading

Here we will list other related books, articles, etc.

Make Peace, Chapter ??

Daas Torah, p.; p...

References

  1. ↑ 1.0 1.1 Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Laws of Shabbos, Section 328:2.
  2. ↑ Code of Jewish Law, Chapter 329:6.
  3. ↑ Rashi, Eruvin 45a; Or Zaru’a, vol. 2, Laws of Shabbat, Section 84.
  4. ↑ Address, 13 Tishrei, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 91; Inside Israel's Ultimate Path to Security, JEM; Audio.
  5. ↑ Samuel I 23:1-5.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Talmud Eruvin 45a.
  7. ↑ 7.0 7.1 7.2 Letter, Third Light of Chanukah, 5741, p. 1.
  8. ↑ Rambam, Sefer Zmanim, Laws of Shabbat 2:23; Shulchan Aruch HaRav, Laws of Shabbos, Section 329:6.
  9. ↑ Address, 9 Teves, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 366; Video; Audio. This seems to be the first time the Rebbe mentioned this law with regard to the Holy Land.
  10. ↑ Private Audience, 4 Tammuz, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3, pp. 1157-1158; The Rebbe's Roadmap to Peace, Episode 3, JEM; Audio.
  11. ↑ Address, 9 Kislev, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 225; Audio.
  12. ↑ Israel and the U.S.: Friendship through Strength, JEM; Syria and Iran, JEM. See Address, 13 Tishrei, 5739. Sichos Kodesh, vol. 1, p. 103; Audio; Address, 29 Iyar, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, pp. 738-739; Audio.
  13. ↑ Israel and the U.S.: Friendship through Strength, JEM.
  14. ↑ For example, Address, 14 Tammuz, 5727. Toras Menachem vol. 50 p. 241; Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 p. 299; Address, 1 Elul, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3 pp. 381-382; Audio.
  15. ↑ Address, 9 Kislev, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, pp. 227-229; Audio.
  16. ↑ Address, Purim, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 44; Audio.
  17. ↑ Address, 14 Iyar, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 292; Inside Israel's Ultimate Path to Security, JEM; Audio; Address, Purim, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 355; Audio; Address, 9 Teves, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 366; Video; Audio; Address, 12 Sivan, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 526; Audio.
  18. ↑ Eruvin 45a; Dr. Yahyam Whistles, “Nehardea Chapter 4 and Final: The Destruction of Nehardea Between Persia and Palmyra: Who Really Destroyed the Babylonian Center of Torah?” Hayadan (December 5, 2025); Nissan Mindel, “Rav Nachman Bar Yaakov,” Chabad.org; Address, 19 Kislev, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 440; Audio; Address, 29 Tishrei, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 252; Audio.
  19. ↑ Address, 1 Elul, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3 p. 384; Audio.
  20. ↑ Address, 22 Nissan, 5729. Toras Menachem vol. 56, p. 137; Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 65; Here to Stay, JEM.
  21. ↑ Or Zaru’a, vol. 2, Laws of Shabbat, Section 84.
  22. ↑ Daniel H. McCauley, "Strategic Depth Reimagined: Expanding Decision Time in 21st Century War," Small Wars Journal, (December 10, 2025).
  23. ↑ For Ben-Gurion's understanding, see Shabtai Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War (Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 294; Michael Bar-Zohar, Ben-Gurion: A Biography (New York: Delacorte Press, 1977) pp. 185–188.
  24. ↑ Address, 13 Tammuz, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3, p. 308; Audio.
  25. ↑ See Eyes Upon the Land - Part 1, Adapted by Eliyahu Touger, chabad.org; “Excerpt From Speech by Premier Meir.” New York Times, March 17, 1971.
  26. ↑ Address, 10 Shevat, 5730. Toras Menachem vol. 59, pp. 111-113; Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, pp. 407-408; Inside Israel's Ultimate Path to Security, JEM; Audio.
  27. ↑ Letter, Third Light of Chanukah, 5741, p. 2.
  28. ↑ Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Chronologies of Modern Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2015), 190–194; “Militants Score Sweeping Victory in West Bank Vote.” New York Times, April 14, 1976; “Pro-PLO, Communist Sweep in West Bank Elections: 72.3% of Eligible Voters, Including Women, Participate.” Jewish Telegraphic Agency, April 14, 1976.
  29. ↑ Address, 13 Tishrei, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 1, p. 107; Audio; Address, 30 Av, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3, p. 377; Audio.
  30. ↑ Andrea Grillo, “Israel’s Defensible Borders: The Crucial Role of Geography,” Deep InSecurity, (February 28, 2024); Supreme Court of Israel, Ayub, et al. v. Minister of Defence, 1979.
  31. ↑ Gershon Hacohen, “HaHagana HaMerchavit BaSfar Chiyunit KeTammid” [in Hebrew]. Mabat Mibasa, June 17, 2018.
  32. ↑ Address, 29 Iyar, 5739. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 739; Audio; Address, 16 Adar II, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, pp. 62-63; Audio; Address, Purim, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 361; Video; Audio; See also Shalom Dov Wolpo, Daas Torah Be’inyonei Hamatzav B’eretz Hakodesh [in Hebrew] (Kiryat Gat, 1982), 133–134.
  33. ↑ “Israel Gives Up an Oilfield to Egypt in Biggest Sacrifice for Treaty Yet.” New York Times, November 26, 1979; “Israel’s Surrender of the Alma Oil Fields to Egypt: An Ill-Conceived Strategic Decision?” The Jewish Press, July 6, 2022.
  34. ↑ Address, Simchas Torah, 5742. Toras Menachem vol. 1, pp. 279-280.
  35. ↑ Address, 29 Elul, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3, p. 1139; Video; Audio. See Elai Rettig and Ziv Rubinovitz, The Palgrave International Handbook of Israel (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan Singapore, 2025), 9–11.
  36. ↑ Address, Purim, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 354; Inside Israel's Ultimate Path to Security, JEM; Audio.
  37. ↑ Kathleen Christison, Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 260.
  38. ↑ “Shlomo Gazit, Israel’s First Military Coordinator for Occupied Land, Dies at 94.” Haaretz, October 9, 2020.
  39. ↑ See also Yechidus, 4 Tammuz, 5740. Sichos Kodesh vol. 3, pp. 1157-1158; Audio.
  40. ↑ Take Responsibility, JEM. See Ron Nachman, Mayor of Ariel, Visits the Rebbe, JEM.
  41. ↑ Suez Crisis, Britannica.
  42. ↑ Address, 20 Av, 5730. Toras Menachem vol. 61, pp. 155-156; Sichos Kodesh vol. 2, p. 460a.
  43. ↑ Israeli Government-Designed Peace Plan After June 1967 War, Center for Israel Education. See Eyes Upon the Land - Part 1, Adapted by Eliyahu Touger, chabad.org.
  44. ↑ Address, 13 Tishrei, 5734. Toras Menachem vol. 74 pp. 79-80; Likkutei Sichos vol. 14 pp. 405-406; Audio.
  45. ↑ Interim Agreement between Israel and Egypt (Sinai II), United Nations Peacemaker.
  46. ↑ Address, 19 Kislev, 5736. Toras Menachem vol. 82 p. ??; Sichos Kodesh vol. 1 pp. 248-249; Audio.
  47. ↑ Litani Operation (1978), Encyclopedia.com
  48. ↑ Address, 14 Iyar, 5738. Sichos Kodesh vol. 2 pp. 287-289; Audio.
  49. ↑ Camp David Accords, Britannica.
  50. ↑ Harvey Sicherman, Palestinian Autonomy, Self-Government, & Peace (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 40, 177.
  51. ↑ Inside Israel's Ultimate Path to Security, JEM; Ron Nachman, Mayor of Ariel, Visits the Rebbe, JEM.
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