Six-Day War: Aftermath – 1967

Israeli Proposed Withdrawal — (1967)  

Aftermath of the Six Day War

Changes in Israel's borders following the Six Day war.

During the Six-Day War in June 1967, Israel made major territorial gains that fundamentally reshaped its strategic position. In the north, it captured the Golan Heights, a commanding plateau that had previously been used by Syrian forces to shell Israeli communities. On its eastern front, Israel took the West Bank, which provided a natural geographic barrier that dramatically enhanced the defense of Israel’s mainland. From Egypt it captured the Sinai Peninsula, turning its previously exposed southern border into a secure and defensible frontier. The peninsula’s rugged terrain made large-scale military movement difficult, while its vast desert expanse acted as a broad buffer zone that slowed potential attacks and allowed additional response time.

Israel’s swift and decisive victory over the combined forces of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria served as a powerful deterrent to neighboring Arab states, and earned widespread respect.

Israel’s Overture

In the days following the 1967 victory, Israel covertly indicated a willingness to make territorial concessions in pursuit of peace with Egypt and Syria, and asked the United States to communicate this position to the Arab countries. The offer was rejected within a few days.

Concurrently, the Rebbe repeatedly urged Israeli leaders not to relinquish any of the territories captured in the war, explaining that retaining these areas was essential for Israel’s security. The Rebbe asserted that only a firm and consistent stance would demonstrate to the superpowers that Israel could not be pressured into territorial concessions.

Some of the attending heads of state at the Arab League Summit in Khartoum following the 1967 War. From left to right: King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Abdullah Sallal of Yemen, Sheikh Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah of Kuwait and Abd al-Rahman Arif of Iraq

In August 1967, Arab leaders convened at the Khartoum Summit, where they adopted the “Three Noes” resolution—no negotiations, no peace, and no recognition of Israel, effectively rejecting the Israeli proposals.

The Rebbe later linked the continued hostilities and the international diplomatic pressure for territorial withdrawal to this offer, arguing that, in the wake of Israel’s decisive victory, the Arab nations had been sufficiently deterred and did not regard renewed war as a viable means of recovering their territory. He posited that the prospect of territorial concessions was perceived in the Arab world as a sign of Israeli weakness, which encouraged its enemies to increase pressure for additional concessions and to renew hostilities:

We’ve seen how this has played out in the past: Every concession gives rise to [. . .] more demands. When Israel yielded a little, the pressure quickly mounted for yet another concession. Not everything at once—just a little, or so it seemed. And when they gave in, it only invited still more pressure! [. . .]

One thing is absolutely clear: Israeli concessions have never resulted in peace. On the contrary—they have consistently paved the way for renewed aggression. And until the conflict resumed, there was always more pressure, with fresh demands for additional concessions. [. . .]

This pattern has been repeating itself ever since the Six-Day War when [. . .] Israel sent envoys to the capital of this country offering to hand territory back.

The Rebbe further contended that no government—including the United States—had expected Israel to return the territories it had captured, and that by volunteering such a step, Israel effectively generated the pressure it would later face:

Immediately after the Six-Day War, a delegation was sent to Washington to announce that Israel was prepared to withdraw and return all the territories!

At that time, in the immediate aftermath of Israel's miraculous and supernatural victory, none of the Arab leaders dared to demand the return of the territories. Not Arafat, not Egypt, not Jordan, not Syria—none of them even dreamed of such a possibility! They were all stunned by Israel’s astonishing victory and could not imagine that they would ever regain those lands—certainly not through waging another war. [. . .]

And yet, without anyone even considering demanding it, Israel itself stepped forward and offered to give it all back: the whole Sinai, all of Judea and Samaria, and more. What’s more, they were even willing to negotiate partly conceding Jerusalem—suggesting it could belong jointly to three different nations! [. . .]

When officials in Washington heard what the Israeli delegation was proposing, they could hardly believe their ears—that Israel truly intended, in all seriousness, to hand back the territories! Once they were finally convinced that this was indeed Israel’s intention, the Americans relayed the message and the offer to the Arabs.

And then a miracle occurred: Despite everything, the Arabs refused to take what Israel was offering them! Their official explanation was that they wanted more than what was being offered—but in practice, the fact remains that they would not accept even what Israel was ready to surrender.

Resurgence of Conflict

On July 1, 1967, less than a month after the conclusion of the Six-Day War, Egypt violated the ceasefire agreement, initiating renewed hostilities that culminated in the War of Attrition (1969–1970).

On November 22, 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces “from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and stressed the necessity of recognizing the sovereignty and political independence of every state in the region.